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The discussions within and between representatives of the ten National Reflection Groups will be discussed by a 
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produce a final NPE report taking into account the national and transnational debates, scheduled to be published at 
the end of 2017. 
The project also benefits from the overall guidance of an Advisory Group of high-ranking policy-makers, academics, 
NGO representatives and other stakeholders from all over Europe. It is chaired by Herman Van Rompuy, President 
Emeritus of the European Council and former Prime Minister of Belgium. 
For more information on the NPE project, please see the project website: www.newpactforeurope.eu 
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FOREWORD 
 
This report is inspired by the discussions of the Finnish National Reflection Group enriched by exchanges with 
National Reflection Groups from Belgium and Portugal. It reflects on the ‘state of the Union’ from a national 
perspective and discusses the main challenges the EU and its members are facing, taking into account both 
the European and national perspective. Finally, it proposes ideas and recommendations on how the EU and 
its members should react to these main challenges and sets out how the EU and European integration should 
develop in the years to come.  
This paper is part of a series of ten national reports. These reports and the debates in the member states will 
provide a solid basis for the discussions in the NPE European Reflection Group. The latter will be asked to 
take the reflection a step further through in-depth and thorough discussions at the European level. The 
Advisory Group chaired by Herman Van Rompuy will provide input to this process. All these reflections will 
lead to a final NPE report that analyses the current ‘state of the Union’ and contains several proposals on 
how to re-energise the European project. It will be published at the end of 2017. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Since becoming a member of the European Union (EU) in 1995, Finland has seen itself as one of the EU’s 
most constructive member states. For the most part during Finland’s membership, the Finnish EU policy has 
aimed at securing and increasing Finland’s influence in the Union by positioning the country firmly at the core 
of the EU and by taking part in key European integration projects. During the years of the financial and 
economic crisis, Finland’s image in the Union gradually started to change, with the country gaining a 
reputation as a hardliner and, at times, as a difficult member state. These developments were related to the 
rapid emergence of an openly populist and Eurosceptic party in the 2010s.  
Notwithstanding the implications of the increasing politicisation and polarisation of EU affairs in Finland, the 
Union and the single currency have however remained distinctly popular among Finnish citizens. One 
explanation for the steady support for the EU is that the basic rationale behind Finland’s EU membership has 
not changed. Finland still sees the Union as a vehicle for security, prosperity and influence. The years of EU 
crises has also increased awareness of the added value of the EU for Finland, and the need to engage with 
the processes aimed to consolidate it. 
From the Finnish perspective, the EU is currently in the midst of several severe crises. These are related to 
the eurocrisis and the rather gloomy broader economic outlook for the EU in recent years, the refugee or 
migration crisis, and the worsening external and internal security situation in the Union. Moreover, the 
notable difficulties experienced by the EU in addressing these crises have contributed to an understanding 
that the EU and European integration themselves are in crisis. However, there are also other key drivers for 
this development, which are only partly EU-related. These relate, inter alia, to a broader lack of trust in 
political systems and institutions, and to the negative effects of globalisation. 
It seems that neither the EU nor its member states were adequately prepared to tackle crises of this scale 
and nature. The Finnish EU narrative also highlights the political difficulties in agreeing and implementing the 
necessary EU-level and national reforms during the crises themselves. Importantly, some of the key 
achievements of European integration and the EU seem to be overshadowed by the current crises. In Finland, 
the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the EU, and the growing dissatisfaction among EU citizens, 
are seen as symptomatic of the Union’s internal crisis and economic challenges.  
In the field of the economy, several challenges have been identified and debated in Finland. These include 
problems related to the eurozone, the economic outlook for the EU and Finland, and the uncertain future of 
the Union’s external trade policy. While more EU action has been called for in order to turn the economic 
tide in Europe, the role of national responsibility and reforms has also been constantly highlighted. 
The national debate on the migration and refugee crisis suggests that the global migration pressure is likely 
to increase, and Europe’s geographical location means that the EU will be the destination for significant 
migration in the future as well. Instability and conflicts in the Union’s neighbourhood are important root 
causes of migration. Finland itself received more than 32,000 asylum applications in 2015. This represented 
a significant increase compared to the very low number of applications received by Finland before the crisis. 
During the autumn of 2015 and spring of 2016, approximately 1,800 asylum-seekers arrived in Finland also 
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through the northern border crossings along Finland’s border with Russia, and the country suddenly became 
an entry point of irregular migration to the EU. In light of the deep divisions between the member states over 
migration, and the current projections on future migration pressure in the EU area, this policy field is in many 
ways seen as a litmus test for the EU and European integration.  
Russia’s more assertive foreign policy and its proven willingness to resort to military force present the most 
significant security challenge for Finland. The Ukraine crisis has also had notable side effects in the Baltic Sea 
region. Importantly, the EU’s room for manoeuvre and its position as a security actor have been challenged 
by the new situation. This is because the EU as a security actor has largely relied on soft power instruments 
and on the promotion of norms. Strengthening the EU’s defence dimension step by step is strongly supported 
in Finland. The looming Brexit and the concerns related to the foreign and security policy of the new US 
administration are seen to further underline the need to move forward in this field. 
Finland’s security interests are not limited to northern Europe. The conflicts and instability in the EU’s 
southern neighbourhood are seen as a security concern in Finland as well. Crisis prevention, mediation and 
management are all regarded as important features of the Finnish security policy and these activities are 
mostly advanced through the EU. In this context, the link between external and internal security has been 
underlined in Finland. The EU’s role in addressing global challenges related to climate change, poverty and 
sustainable development continues to resonate with the Finnish public and decision-makers. 
There is an urgent need to articulate a convincing political message at the EU and national levels, thereby 
providing straightforward answers to the questions and concerns raised by EU citizens. This message must 
be credible in the sense that concrete actions and positive developments will follow. It should acknowledge 
the negative effects of globalisation and the increasing global competition within the economy and politics, 
which are reflected in developments in Europe and beyond. The message should also touch upon global 
challenges and their management, as well as Europe’s changed security environment. 
A major overhaul of EU structures is not seen as necessary at present. Instead of institutional reforms, 
pragmatic and effective action are called for. In order for convincing steps to be taken, enhanced cooperation 
and multispeed integration could be a way forward, but its implications for the coherence and unity of the 
EU should be carefully considered. To forge political will, the EU must work on reinforcing mutual trust 
between the member states. And the member states must do their share in this process. A strong European 
Commission and an influential European Parliament are needed to forge and articulate a convincing political 
message at the EU level and to connect directly with EU citizens.  
Importantly, a stronger focus on the social dimension of the EU is called for. This would benefit from a 
European-wide political discussion followed by EU-level action aimed at (re-)establishing European social 
norms. Relatedly, the responsibilities and competences to enforce them should also be discussed. Moreover, 
the EU should continue to forcefully develop its single markets and, in so doing, become a global frontrunner 
in the digital revolution. Given the expectations of citizens and member states towards the EU, adequate 
resources to address these issues must be secured at the EU level. 
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PART 1: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE 
UNION: A VIEW FROM FINLAND 
 
BACKGROUND: FINLAND’S EU POLICY 
Finland has seen itself as one of the most constructive member states of the Union. It joined the EU in 1995 
without reservations. Despite its Cold War-era legacy of neutrality, Finland also became a strong supporter 
of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies. Finland has, however, decided to stay outside of military 
alliances. Compared with its closest reference group, the other Nordic countries, Finland has chosen to 
integrate itself more deeply into the EU. It was the only Nordic EU member that joined the third phase of the 
Economic and Monetary Union in 1999 and adopted the euro in 2002. Denmark, which joined the EU in 1973, 
has clung to its opt-outs secured in the Maastricht Treaty, including the right to stay outside of the euro area. 
Sweden also decided not to adopt the euro after its electorate rejected the possibility of euro membership 
in a referendum in 2002. Norway and Iceland are not EU members, but they participate in the European 
Economic Area and the Schengen area.   
For the most part during Finland’s membership, the country’s EU policy has aimed at securing and increasing 
Finland’s influence in the EU by positioning the country firmly at the core of the EU and by taking part in key 
European integration projects. At the same time, Finland has also striven to accumulate political capital 
through active and constructive engagement in EU decision-making. According to the Finnish logic, the 
political capital gained over the years can be used in difficult situations when significant national interests 
are at stake. As a part of its constructive approach towards EU policy, Finland has also reasoned that if a 
majority is forming in the Council, it is generally wiser to align itself with it and thereby gain possibilities to 
shape the outcome, rather than marginalize itself in the minority. This has arguably led to Finland establishing 
a reputation as a well- behaving ‘model pupil’ in the EU ‘classroom’. However, Finnish EU decision-makers 
do not accept this characterisation without reservations. Indeed, some think that this characterisation is false 
given that the country has continuously worked hard to advance its interests in the EU.  
During the years of the financial and economic crisis, Finland’s image in the EU gradually started to change, 
with the country gaining a reputation as an increasingly difficult member state. In stark contrast to its early 
membership period, Finland did not even shy away from obstructing some of the joint efforts to tackle the 
euro crisis. Finland’s tougher political rhetoric and policies are anchored in domestic developments. 
Participation in the measures to reinforce the currency union, and particularly in the loan programmes aimed 
at shoring up the failing eurozone economies, proved highly unpopular in Finland and led to exceptional 
changes in the Finnish political landscape. The country duly witnessed the rapid emergence of an openly 
populist and Eurosceptic party, the Finns Party (formerly known as the True Finns), in the 2011 parliamentary 
elections. The Finns Party retained its support in the 2015 elections, and became the second largest party in 
the country, joining the three-party government coalition.   
As a result, the pervasive national consensus that largely characterised Finland’s EU policy in the early part of 
its membership broke down during the eurocrisis. The re-politicisation of Finland’s EU policy has resulted in a 
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hardening tone and tougher negotiation positions, including, atypically, some ‘red lines’ in EU policy-making. 
While some see this as an element of a more mature EU policy, others have suggested that Finland has rapidly 
lost much of the political capital that it had gained through its earlier constructive engagement. 
Notwithstanding the increasing politicisation and polarisation related to some EU issues, the EU and the 
single currency have remained distinctly popular among Finnish citizens. According to the Eurobarometer 
survey conducted in 2016, 60% of Finnish respondents see Finland’s EU membership as a ‘good thing’, 30% 
as ‘neither good nor bad’ and only 10% as a ‘bad thing’.1 A striking 78% of Finnish respondents are supportive 
of the EMU and the single currency.2  
These figures speak for a rather profound significance of the EU and European integration for the Finns. The 
euro membership is understood to be an integral part of Finland’s deep involvement in European integration. 
While the citizens might be dissatisfied with the EU’s actions in tackling the crisis, the basic rationale behind 
Finland’s EU membership has not changed. Finns still sees the EU as a vehicle for prosperity and international 
influence, and they highly value the opportunities brought by the freedom of movement, for instance. The 
dramatic changes in the European security environment – the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea – has also highlighted the EU’s importance for Finland’s security. While economic factors featured 
high in the Finnish EU membership discussion in the early 1990s, it is largely accepted that security 
considerations were equally important. Relatedly, and although the EU and European integration have 
occasionally proved to be divisive issues for some of Finland’s political parties, all of the major parties, with 
the exception of the Finns Party, can be labelled as pro-EU.  
A noteworthy aspect of the recent populist and Eurosceptic challenge has been Finland’s rather unique way of 
handling the issue. First, and in terms of the functioning of the political system, the emergence of a new major 
party was generally welcomed. After the 2011 parliamentary election, the former president of the republic 
stated that she was pleased that the Finns had rushed to the polling stations rather than into the streets to 
voice their political opinions. Experts have also noted that the emergence of a Eurosceptic challenge – and the 
temporary breakdown of the national consensus on some aspects of Finland’s EU policy – have been good for 
the national EU debate. It has meant that EU affairs were being debated more than they were before in the 
public domain, including during national election campaigns and the parliament’s plenaries. Political parties 
have had to clarify their EU policies, and governments have had to explain and defend their policies more 
vigorously than during the times of broad national consensus.  
Second, a rather broad consensus emerged in the run-up to the 2015 parliamentary elections that the 
continuing success of the Finns Party would mean that the party should be included in the government. In 
practice, this signalled a readiness on the part of the other parties to also make some concessions in the field 
of EU policy. Yet the Finns Party was also urged to prepare itself for compromises on EU matters. As a result, 
the EU policy of Finland’s current government coalition is based on a somewhat uneasy compromise between 
pro-integrationist and moderate Eurosceptic positions. Nevertheless, the government has sought to advance 
EU integration in those areas that are of particular interest to Finland, especially the security and defence 
                                                                
1 Parlemeter 2016 - Analytical overview, Special Eurobarometer of the European Parliament, p. 15, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2016/parlemetre/eb86_1_parlemeter_synthesis_en.pdf. 
2 Standard Eurobarometer 86, Autumn 2016 - First results, Public opinion in the European Union, p. 27, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/finland/sites/finland/files/eb86_first_en.pdf.  
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policy. On the other hand, the government has occasionally been blamed for not having a broader vision for 
the future of the EU and Finland’s place therein. 
While they have been a part of the coalition government, support for the Finns Party has declined significantly 
according to opinion polls. Some see this as a sign of the difficulties that populist parties face in translating 
their agenda into concrete policies. On the other hand, some elements of the Finns Party’s political agenda 
have been (partly) mainstreamed in Finnish politics. In other words, in responding to the political challenge 
of the Finns Party, other parties have re-positioned themselves, and at times moved closer to the position 
adopted by the Finns Party. The most notable example is the Finnish immigration policy, which had already 
been tightened before the European migration crisis. The Finns Party has also taken credit for influencing the 
Finnish government’s tough negotiation positions vis-à-vis rescue loan packages, first as the opposition, and 
then through the government. 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN CRISIS 
The EU has been tackling several and severe crises in recent years. These include the euro and broader 
economic crisis, the refugee or migration crisis, and the worsening external and internal security situation of 
the Union. The former consists of instability and conflicts in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods, 
and the latter of radicalisation and terrorism (among others). The notable difficulties of the EU and its 
member states in addressing many of these crises have contributed to an understanding that the EU and 
European integration themselves are in crisis. The crises are also seen as a key driver of the different forms 
of Euroscepticism and populism in the EU member states, including Finland.  
These political trends are also connected to the negative effects of globalisation. Importantly, the global 
financial crisis, its long-term negative implications for the EU and its member states’ economies as well as 
the increasingly competitive global milieu have had political ramifications in many liberal democracies. As 
some of the risks and threats related to the globalisation have materialised, the positive effects of it have 
been at least partly overshadowed in Finland. Citizens feel that managing the ongoing developments and 
challenges are partly beyond the control of their government. Majority of the Finns however see the EU as 
part of the solution in addressing the global and regional challenges.  
From a Finnish point of view, it seems that neither the EU nor its member states were adequately prepared 
to tackle crises of this scale and nature. Member states have largely failed to anticipate the worst and agree 
on major reforms both at the EU and at the national level during the pre-crisis years when the European and 
global economy and politics were evolving under more benign conditions. This applies to all three key 
dimensions of the crises: the economy, migration and security. The member states did not agree to deepen 
the EMU in the Convention on the Future of Europe in the early 2000s. Nor did they take the warnings 
regarding the possibility of a large migration crisis seriously enough, even on the eve of the worst refugee 
crisis in Europe since the Second World War. And finally, they did not advance security and defence policy 
cooperation despite signs of potential and dramatic changes in the European security landscape. In a similar 
vein, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty reforms concerning the EU’s external action proved difficult 
even in the context of largely recognised shifts in the global economy and politics, and the ensuing challenges 
to Europe and the EU.  
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The Finnish EU narrative also highlights the political difficulties in agreeing and implementing the necessary 
EU and national reforms during the crises themselves. In this context, the commonly held view that crises 
are watershed moments for the further development of the EU has been called into question, at least to 
some extent. The fact that common European solutions to the different crises have proven difficult to 
advance, has further served to decrease citizens’ trust in the future of the EU.  
Importantly, some of the key achievements of European integration and the EU seem to be overshadowed 
by the current crises. Peace and stability in Europe as well as the four freedoms guaranteed by the EU are 
often taken for granted. The crises have also overshadowed some of the key reforms that have been 
implemented in recent years, some of which were seen as too difficult, politically, to be advanced earlier. 
These include reinforcing the EMU and EU’s external borders, for instance. Moreover, some of the positive 
trends in the EU, such as the recent economic growth, the declining unemployment and the decreasing 
sovereign depth levels, have gone largely unnoticed due to the strong focus on the crises as well as Finland’s 
own economic downturn. 
In Finland, the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU, has been partly connected to the EU’s internal crisis 
and economic challenges. While the EU renegotiation and referendum process of the UK was largely the 
result of domestic political dynamics, the recent negative developments in the EU have unquestionably 
contributed to the outcome of the process. 
THE EU’S LEGITIMACY CHALLENGED 
Distinct views on the EU’s democratic shortcomings can be identified in the Finnish EU debate. Suggestions 
that stronger democratic legitimacy would require a more powerful European Parliament are often refuted 
in Finland by hinting at the EP’s alleged detachment from the electorate, reflected in the low turnout in the 
European elections. Relatedly, the democratic legitimacy of the European Council and the Council of the EU 
is at times argued to be stronger than that of the European Commission and the European Parliament. Finnish 
policymakers also often highlight the deep involvement of the Finnish parliament in EU decision-making, 
extending all the way up to the political mandating of Finland’s representatives in the European Council and 
the Council.  
At the same time, the potential challenges and dangers related to the increasingly powerful role of the 
European Council in the EU have been underlined by many Finnish EU experts and practitioners, who 
continue to view the European Commission and the traditional Community Method as the strongest 
safeguards against the dominance of large EU member states. This reasoning partly explains why Finland has 
accepted transfers of competences in consecutive EU Treaty reforms, including the Lisbon Treaty, even if the 
public opinion has been wary of granting more powers to the EU level. While the role and policy positions of 
Germany have been largely welcomed in Finland in relation to the eurocrisis and the Ukrainian crisis, the 
challenges related to the influence of smaller member states have also been acknowledged. In the context 
of the EU’s reflection process launched in Bratislava after the Brexit vote, the informal meetings among the 
biggest member states, as well as the founding members, have been seen to be problematic, as they are not 
open for all the member states.  
While there is debate in Finland about the role of ‘input legitimacy’ in European integration, the EU’s 
suggested legitimacy deficit is increasingly understood to result from the Union’s weak performance rather 
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than its alleged democratic shortcomings. Some dissatisfaction with the EU can be sensed even among the 
traditionally pro-European elites. Notably, the economic elites that were vocal supporters of Finnish EU 
membership in the 1990s have until recently remained rather silent in the national debates on the EU’s 
future. At the same time, national policymakers, including civil servants, have been expressing their 
frustration with developments in the EU for a longer time. They have been worried about the state of the EU 
ever since the failure to adopt the Constitutional Treaty, and have highlighted the problems with regards to 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Even before the financial and economic crisis, Finnish policymakers 
expressed their concerns about the efficiency of the enlarged EU and the decreased level of ambition in the 
post-Lisbon context. This has occasionally spurred discussions about alternative channels through which 
Finland could gain influence in Europe and beyond. Most important of these is cooperation in the Nordic 
framework. More Nordic cooperation has been called for in the field of foreign policy, for instance. This is 
partly related to the difficulties in moving forward in some fields in the EU foreign policy, such as promoting 
women’s re-productive health rights, and sexual and gender minorities rights. Nordic cooperation has also 
advanced in the field of defence cooperation. However, the opportunities afforded by the alternative 
arrangements are mostly seen to fall short of those provided by the EU, and Nordic cooperation is seen as 
complementary to Finland’s EU membership.  
In sum, a more cautious national approach and narrative concerning the EU and its future have gained a 
foothold in Finland. At the same time, the importance of the EU for Finland is broadly acknowledged. As the 
EU and European integration has been called into question, awareness of its added value for Finland, and the 
need to engage with the processes aimed to consolidate it, has however also increased. 
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PART 2: THE MAIN CHALLENGES FACED BY 
THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES 
 
ECONOMY 
In the field of economy, several challenges have been identified and debated in Finland. These include 
problems related to the eurozone governance, the gloomy economic outlook for the EU and Finland, and the 
uncertain future of the Union’s external trade policy. While more EU unity and action has been called for to 
turn the economic tide in Europe, the role of national responsibility and reforms has also been constantly 
highlighted. In the wake of the Brexit vote and increasing populism and Euroscepticism around Europe, the 
social dimension of the EU and European integration has become more prominent in the debate, although 
some significant reservations remain.  
A central negative trend in the EU is that the convergence between the economies of the member states has 
come to a halt and has even been partly replaced by a growing divergence. The gradual recovery in recent years 
is largely a result of the extraordinary measures taken by the European Central Bank. Public and private sector 
debt levels are still a valid concern. The financial sector is still in an unhealthy state, as the recent worries related 
to the Italian banks suggest. Moreover, the long-term growth prospects of many eurozone economies continue 
to be weak, including those of Finland and many major economies such as Italy and France.  
Several old and new challenges have also been raised in Finland. First, although financial market regulation 
has improved and the EMU has been strengthened, concluding the banking union has proven challenging 
due to prevailing national differences. The mechanisms established to provide greater fiscal and budgetary 
supervision of the member states have proved somewhat weaker than expected. It has also been debated 
whether the eurozone is guided by rules or by politics, especially now that the European Commission has 
taken a more political approach. The Commission’s recommendation to give some leeway to France, Italy 
and Belgium in 2015, has raised concerns related to political discretion in the application of the reinforced 
fiscal and budgetary rules for the eurozone economies.  
Finland itself has faced a significant economic downturn. The healthy state of the country’s public finances at 
the beginning of the European financial and economic crisis enabled the country to absorb a significant 
decrease in its GDP in 2009, and then bounce back. However, the country subsequently slid into a long period 
of stagnation. In Finland, the country’s economic difficulties are only partly seen to be of external origin. Indeed, 
the bulk of expert and political opinions suggest that the current economic downturn is largely the result of 
domestic failures to prepare for and accommodate to the changing global and European economic trends. 
Finland faced a severe economic crisis in early 1990s, and it managed to recover from it largely without 
external assistance. During the followed rapid growth period, some of the potential risks such as the country’s 
dependence on its extensive information technology cluster driven by Nokia Corporation were frequently 
discussed publically. Finns have also at least partly accepted that during the extensive growth period, the 
country lost some of its competitiveness due to increasing production costs. The strong performance of the 
  
7 
New Pact for Europe - National Report - FINLAND 
neighbouring Swedish economy during the years of the European economic crisis is mainly seen as a result 
of successful national reforms undertaken prior to and during the crisis, as well as better functioning labour 
markets. Only a relatively modest debate concerning the comparative advantages and disadvantages of euro 
membership has taken place, and membership of the currency union has been considered to ultimately be a 
political choice.  
Due to Finland’s self-critical attitude towards its economic problems, there seems to be only limited 
understanding for the calls by some member states to reassess the economic rationale of the reinforced 
financial rules of the eurozone. Finland itself has attempted to do its utmost to comply with the rules even 
during the national economic downturn. Yet it has also been noted that Finland’s economic woes cannot be 
directly compared to those of the countries that were hit worst by the financial and eurozone crisis.  
The push towards a deeper Economic and Monetary Union is facing significant challenges in the long term as 
well. Two broad scenarios have been outlined in Finland in terms of the future development of the EMU, 
which could either be developed towards (i) a centralised system including greater joint responsibility, or 
(ii) a system largely based on market discipline and national responsibility. Both systems have their strengths 
and weaknesses, and as long as greater joint responsibility is not a politically feasible option, a market 
discipline system is likely to prevail. To function well enough, experts have noted that this system might 
require a mechanism for restructuring the member states’ debt and a limited increase in joint responsibility, 
as well as elements of centralised decision-making. The current government is however hesitant in moving 
towards this direction. The introduction of a fiscal capacity or automatic stabilisers to absorb asymmetrical 
shocks to the eurozone economies would most likely go against the governmental programme (that is, the 
coalition agreement between the three parties in the current government).3 The programme states that 
Finland’s liabilities should not increase, and that Finland does not support an EU Treaty change, which is seen 
as a requirement for the above-mentioned reforms. As only rather modest EMU reform proposals have been 
advanced since the new government started in 2015, the official Finnish position remains untested.4 
As an export-driven, open and relatively small economy, Finland is increasingly worried about the protectionist 
global trends. The country is also concerned about the possible ramifications of the UK’s withdrawal for the 
EU’s external trade policy, as well as the development of the single market. In these policy fields, Finland has 
often aligned itself with the UK in EU decision-making and the looming Brexit is expected to have a significant 
impact on the relative power of the ‘free-traders’ (i.e. member states favouring trade liberalisation) within the 
EU. With regard to external trade, it is notable that in Finland both businesses and trade unions support the 
concluded and ongoing free trade negotiations between the EU and its external partners. 
In light of the rising Euroscepticism, the recent economic developments and the potential impact of growing 
international competition, the need to work on the social dimension of the EU has been recognised in Finland. 
The Brexit vote is at least partly seen as a result of the unsuccessful management of the negative effects of 
globalisation. It has highlighted that political campaigns suggesting that the EU is part of the economic and 
                                                                
3 See, Prime Minister’s Office 2015, pp. 34-36 (See “List of further readings”). 
4 Yet the escalation of the Greek crisis in the summer 2015 immediately after the current Finnish government was appointed, 
highlighted the need to consider new EMU reforms. Then Finance Minister Alexander Stubb established an expert working group 
to assess the need for EMU reforms in the short and long term. This work has largely been seen to favour a model based on 
market discipline and national responsibility. For more, see Ministry of Finance, 2015 (included in “List of further readings”).  
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social problems can resonate with the electorate. However, some notable obstacles remain in advancing EU’s 
social dimension. The divergence of social norms and systems across the member states in particular renders 
this a thorny project.  Finns are traditionally concerned that EU action in this field could have negative 
repercussions for the relatively high social standards in Finland. And as Finns seem to be very hesitant to 
increase the country’s financial contribution to EU, the national discussion on the EU’s social dimension has 
so far been rather limited, and there has been a tendency to underline the member states’ responsibility in 
this policy field. Yet the continuing populist and Eurosceptic challenge present in many national elections 
throughout the EU, could potentially open up some possibilities to consider EU wide standards, and over 
time limited expansion of ‘EU’s globalisation funds’, for instance, which could be used to support member 
states under stress to meet the EU standards. 
Importantly, taxation is an economic policy field in which there seems to be a relatively broad agreement that 
more EU-level coordination is needed. In particular, the recent national decisions to decrease corporate 
taxation are seen to result in a ‘race to the bottom’, which would prove very harmful for national governments 
struggling under austerity pressures. EU action in the field of tax evasion is therefore strongly supported. 
MIGRATION 
Discussions on migration and the refugee crisis suggests that even if the recent migration flows are 
unprecedented, they could turn out to be merely the beginning of a broader mass movement. The global 
migration pressure is likely to increase and Europe’s geographical location means that the EU will be the 
destination for significant irregular migration in the future as well. Instability and conflicts in the EU’s 
neighbourhoods are important root causes of migration. Fragile state and governance structures in some of 
the neighbouring countries also weaken the EU’s possibilities to manage the migration externally. Thus, the 
EU should pay attention to the development of the countries of origin of the migrants and refugees. Current 
data indicate that in the Middle East alone, millions of people are on the move. Developments in Africa also 
indicate potentially significant flows to the EU.5 
Finland itself received 32,476 asylum seekers in 2015. This represented a dramatic increase compared to the 
very low number of applications received by Finland before the crisis (annually 1,500 - 6,000 since 2000).6 
Most of the asylum-seekers came to Finland in autumn 2015 via Sweden. From the Finnish perspective, the 
situation in autumn 2015 was seen to have three key dimensions. Firstly, it was a humanitarian crisis, which 
required the EU and its member states to fulfil their international responsibilities. Secondly, it also 
represented an EU crisis, as the Union’s current system of managing irregular migration failed in many 
respects. Previous calls to prepare for an increase in external migration flows were not taken seriously by the 
member states. Moreover, when the system failed (for example with regard to receiving and registering 
people arriving in the country of entry), new measures were adopted, but their implementation (such as 
setting up ‘hotspots’ to manage the situation in the entry countries as well as relocation) has been only partial 
and the situation remains fragile. The deal between Turkey and the EU has also proved to be delicate, and 
the reduction in the numbers has partly resulted from other measures, such as the closure of the Western 
Balkan route. Thirdly, the situation led to extraordinary political polarisation at the national and the EU level, 
                                                                
5 For an overview of the current trends, see Parkes, 2016 (included in “List of further readings”). 
6 Ministry of the Interior of Finland, “Refugees flee persecution in their home countries”, available at: 
http://intermin.fi/en/migration/refugees-and-asylum-seekers.  
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with significant political ramifications. At the EU level, a deep dividing line emerged between those member 
states opposing and supporting proposals for greater burden sharing to manage the crisis. In Finland, the 
refugee issue not only led to polarisation among political parties, but also in society in general.  
The number one priority should now be the integration of those that have been granted asylum. The second 
priority should be to reinforce the Schengen system. This includes the recent proposals for reforms in asylum 
and migration policy, and proposals aimed at strengthening the EU’s external borders. As burden-sharing 
continues to be a thorny issue among the member states, initiatives suggesting a more differentiated 
approach could be carefully assessed. This could entail establishing relocation among the members willing to 
participate in the scheme, and others contributing financially to the system, for instance. Third, the EU’s 
external action is key in finding long-term solutions to global and regional migration pressure. Common 
action and the use of the EU’s entire toolbox is very much in demand. 
The unexpected and worrying developments at Finland’s border with Russia during the winter of 2015-16 
also influenced in the national migration debate. Finland suddenly became an entry point of illegal migration 
to the Schengen area. During the autumn of 2015 and spring of 2016, approximately 1,800 asylum-seekers 
arrived in Finland through the northern border crossings along Finland’s border with Russia.7 This indicated 
a change in Russian border modalities, as prior to that no one without a Schengen visa had been allowed to 
enter the border zone. While keeping the EU and Frontex informed, Finland used its bilateral ties to Russia 
to negotiate a solution, and the flow of asylum-seekers through Russia diminished. It is still largely unclear 
why the situation changed at the Finnish-Russian border. While there is some indication of an increasing 
migration pressure to Europe via Russia, the Finnish president has recently suggested that it was clear that 
Russia wanted to send Finland a signal. Earlier, Norway (also a member of the Schengen area) had managed 
to resolve a similar situation at its northern border with Russia by dealing with Russia bilaterally.  
In light of the deep divisions between the member states over migration, and the current projections on 
future migration pressure in the EU area, this policy field is in many ways seen as a litmus test for the EU and 
European integration.  
SECURITY 
From the Finnish perspective, Russia’s more assertive foreign policy and its proven willingness to resort to 
military force present the most significant security challenge. The Ukraine crisis has had notable side effects 
in the Baltic Sea region as well. Military activity has increased significantly, and several EU member states’ 
airspaces have been violated by Russia. Due to the increased military activity in the Baltic Sea region, NATO 
has reinforced its presence in the area. While Finland understands that Russia’s actions concerns first and 
foremost the EU member states with close geographical proximity to Russia, it has underlined that the 
Ukraine crisis and annexation of Crimea constitutes a fundamental challenge to the European security order, 
and thus for the whole Union. 
                                                                
7 Ministry of the Interior of Finland, 2016. Press release, available at: http://intermin.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/sisaministeri-
orpo-ja-komissaari-avramopoulos-keskustelivat-euroopan-turvapaikanhakijatilanteesta-ja-dublin-asetuksen-
muuttamisesta?_101_INSTANCE_jyFHKc3on2XC_languageId=en_US.  
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Importantly, the EU’s room for manoeuvre and its position as a security actor have been challenged by the 
new situation. This is because the EU as a security actor has largely relied on soft power instruments and on 
the promotion of norms. As power politics and the use of military power have forcefully returned to the 
European theatre, Finland has been a notably vocal supporter of developing the EU’s defence dimension, not 
least because it is not a member of NATO. In this context, Finland has also underlined the importance of the 
EU’s mutual assistance clause (TEU 42.7). When the French government requested the activation of the 
clause in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris, Finland responded positively. Furthermore, Finland is 
currently reviewing its national legislation concerning the provision and reception of military assistance in 
order to fully live up to the requirements of the clause. In the EU, Finland has also highlighted the need to 
develop capabilities to counter hybrid threats. It is currently engaged in establishing a European Centre of 
Excellence on Hybrid Threats in Helsinki in close cooperation with the EU, NATO and several member states 
of either or both organisations.  
Strengthening the EU’s defence dimension step by step is strongly supported in Finland. The looming Brexit 
and the concerns related to the foreign and security policy of the new US administration are seen to further 
underline the need to move forward in this field. However, the lack of a common and shared strategic vision 
for the EU’s security and defence policy might continue to hinder the development in this field. This also 
explains why many member states have been rather reluctant thus far to invest resources and political efforts 
in common security and defence projects. While the new EU Global Strategy is clearly an improvement in this 
respect, concrete action is now needed. The EU’s crisis management capabilities and European military assets 
are very much in demand also due to developments in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. From the Finnish 
viewpoint, permanent structured cooperation could be used if needed in order to move forward in EU 
security and defence cooperation. The government has noted that cooperation should be ambitious, and 
extend beyond EU’s crisis management. Important fields of cooperation for Finland are countering hybrid 
threats, receiving and providing assistance under mutual assistance clause, enhancing defence capabilities 
and logistic support, as well as investing in European defence industry and research. Finland has also 
supported the European External Action Service in promoting the inclusiveness of the permanent structured 
cooperation, and allowing member states to decide which concrete projects they will engage with.  
In addition to developing the EU’s security and defence policy dimension, Finland has welcomed the Nordic 
defence cooperation (with its pooling and sharing prospects) and has sought to deepen its bilateral defence 
cooperation with Sweden, another non-NATO EU member. At the same time, both Finland and Sweden have 
increased their cooperation with NATO, as well as with the US. While the recent developments have led to a 
public discussion about the possibility of Finnish NATO membership, there is a rather broad national consensus 
that Finland should not currently seek membership, although it would like to keep its options open. 
Apart from the security and defence dimension, the importance of the EU’s diplomatic and political toolbox, 
including sanctions against Russia, has also been highlighted in Finland, even though the Russian 
countermeasures have had negative economic implications for Finland. As far as the sanctions are concerned, 
the EU is seen to have demonstrated much needed unity, although some divisions remain.   
Finland’s security interests are not limited to northern Europe. The conflicts and instability in the EU’s 
southern neighbourhood are seen as a security concern in Finland too, and the country is engaged in missions 
aimed at security-sector reforms in the region. Crisis prevention, mediation and management are all seen as 
important features of the Finnish security policy, and these activities are mostly advanced through the EU.  
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In this context, the link between external and internal security has been underlined in Finland. The country 
has witnessed the departure of a relatively high number of fighters to Syria and Iraq in terms of its population 
and demographic factors.8 Internal security threats, such as terrorism and the risks related to radicalisation 
in general and the return of foreign fighters in particular have been taken very seriously in also Finland. 
Terrorist assaults in other Nordic countries, most recently in Sweden, as well as in other EU countries, have 
increased public awareness of these threats also in Finland. To tackle these issues, more coordination and 
information-sharing among member states in the fields of police cooperation and intelligence agencies is 
seen as imperative. Relatedly, the heightened security concerns of EU member states hit by terrorism is well 
understood in Finland. The country is currently reviewing its national legislation on intelligence partly in order 
to enable closer European and international collaboration.  
The EU’s role in addressing global challenges related to climate change, poverty and sustainable development 
continues to resonate strongly with the Finnish public and decision-makers. These challenges are often seen as 
root causes of instability and insecurity. However, the current government’s austerity measures have had 
negative implications for the country’s development aid budget and efforts. Nevertheless, Finland sees the EU’s 
attempts to forge effective multilateral solutions to the challenges of the 21st century as highly important.  
                                                                
8 The Finnish Security Intelligence Service terrorist threat assessment suggest ”the number of persons taking part in armed 
activities in foreign conflicts - especially in Syria and Iraq - and returning to Finland is significant”, and that ”at least 80 adults and 
dozens of children had travelled to these conflict zones” by the end of 2016. See, SUPO - Finnish Security Intelligence Service 
2017. Year Book 2016, available at: 
http://www.supo.fi/instancedata/prime_product_julkaisu/intermin/embeds/supowwwstructure/72829_SUPO_2016_ENG.pdf?
304cc2d77276d488.  
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PART 3: A WAY FORWARD FOR THE EU: 
MANAGING GLOBALISATION 
 
In light of all this, the Finnish reflection group arrived at some general conclusions regarding the future of 
collaboration at the EU level. While the discussion on a vision and mission for the EU was intense and 
detailed, some points of consensus also emerged, which contributed to largely shared views on the question 
of what kind of an EU Finland should strive for.  
First, there is an urgent need to articulate a convincing political message at the EU and the national levels, 
thereby providing straightforward answers to the questions and concerns of EU citizens. And this message 
must be credible in the sense that concrete actions and positive developments will follow. The message 
should acknowledge the real and perceived negative effects of globalisation and increasing global 
competition in the economy and politics, which are reflected in developments in Europe and beyond. The 
message should touch upon global challenges and their management, as well as Europe’s changed security 
environment. Importantly, this message should be increasingly discussed with the citizens as well. New 
technologies open up possibilities for greater outreach activities, and the public seem to be increasingly 
interested in engaging in a debate on the future of the EU. 
Second, a major overhaul of EU structures is not necessary. Instead of institutional reforms, pragmatic and 
effective action is now needed. As there are several major projects underway in the field of the economy, 
migration and security, and the Treaties establish a functioning basis for European integration, the focus should 
be first and foremost on the political will to act according to the Treaties and to seek consensus to advance the 
necessary reforms. To forge political will, the EU must work on reinforcing trust among the member states. A 
shared understanding of the benefits and prospects provided by the EU and European integration is a 
prerequisite for this. And the member states must do their share in realising and communicating this. Restoring 
trust also requires compliance to the commonly agreed principles, rules, and decisions.    
Third, the inadequate joint EU action to tackle the multiple crises is partly linked to the classic problem of 
intergovernmentalism. The increasingly powerful role of the European Council and the changed role of the 
European Commission are symptomatic of this in the EU. While the Lisbon Treaty reforms have been helpful 
in establishing the European Council firmly within the EU’s institutional system with its checks and balances, 
a strong European Commission and European Parliament are also needed to forge and articulate a convincing 
political message at the EU level and to connect directly with EU citizens. They are also needed to balance 
the asymmetrical power relations among the member states.   
Fourth, in order for pragmatic and convincing steps to be taken, enhanced cooperation and multispeed 
integration could be a way forward. While this approach has some potential, it also has its limits. Multispeed 
integration might work in some fields (e.g. defence). But many of the reforms currently on the table relate 
either to the euro area or the Schengen area, and it might be counterproductive to aim to introduce elements 
of multispeed integration within these areas of deeper integration. This could lead to increasing divergence 
among the euro members and Schengen countries. The key principle of the flexible or differentiated 
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integration of inclusiveness enshrined in the EU Treaties should also be respected. Deeper integration should 
be open for all willing and able member states, but the creation of a more or less exclusive ’core Europe’ 
involving only a limited number of member states can further damage the trust among the member states. 
CONCRETE STEPS NEEDED 
While the declarations of Bratislava (2016) and Rome (2017) mark significant steps in reinforcing European 
integration and the EU, envisaged projects and reforms must be spelled out in detail, and advanced with 
determination. 
Importantly, a stronger focus on the social dimension of the EU is needed. Given the diversity of social norms 
in Europe, an EU-wide political discussion on them would be helpful to establish common understanding and 
map out the different challenges member states and citizens are facing. On a more concrete level, this 
discussion should aim to clarify and, if needed, review the responsibilities to enforce social norms. This 
discussion should also be future-oriented. Streamlining and reforming European social security systems 
should be in the interests of member states due to the expected transformations related to technological 
developments and automatisation, which will shape the prospects and character of work in Europe. In 
response, the EU should ever more forcefully develop its single markets and, in so doing, become a global 
frontrunner in the digital revolution.  
Managing these large-scale changes, which will have consequences for EU citizens, as well as the private and 
public sectors, clearly demands European investment, steering and regulation. The EU and its member states’ 
success in managing the effects of globalisation and ongoing technological transformations is directly linked 
to its legitimacy, and hence will crucially influence the Union’s ability to shape these developments regionally 
and globally. In an increasingly multipolar world, there is an urgent need for the EU to continue to assume 
leadership in trade, climate change, sustainability and development.  
The EU has recently indicated that it wants to assume greater responsibility in protecting its citizens. 
Enhancing and streamlining European defence capabilities and developing structures and mechanisms to 
address internal security challenges must therefore be a key priority, because the failure to live up to the 
expectations now raised by the EU would harm the legitimacy of integration. However, these developments 
must fully comply with the EU’s core values. 
The EU and its member states must furthermore develop more efficient tools to safeguard the European 
values enshrined in the EU Treaties. This could include establishing a stronger and continuous review process 
on the rule of law principle and fundamental rights in the member states at the EU level, which could result 
in recommendations and the monitoring of their implementation. In case of severe concerns, unanimity 
requirement for sanctioning procedure should be reviewed. The rule of law is a principle of utmost 
importance for the future of the EU and European integration. It is a core value in its own right and, as such, 
it constitutes the foundation of Europe’s political, economic and judicial integration.    
Finally, given the expectations of the citizens and member states towards the EU, adequate resources to 
address the abovementioned issues must be secured at the EU level. The scope of EU integration and the 
Union’s responsibilities should not be increased without providing for a solid funding base and opportunities. 
Hence, the negotiations about the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) are key in terms of the 
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future of the EU and European integration. The UK’s withdrawal and its unavoidable financial consequences 
will further underline the importance of the next MFF. In this context, strengthening the EU’s own resources 
could prove to be the most productive way forward, as increasing member states’ payments to the EU is 
politically difficult. 
  
  
15 
New Pact for Europe - National Report - FINLAND 
LIST OF FURTHER READINGS 
 
Ministry of Finance, 2015. Improving the resilience of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, Ministry of 
Finance publications 37b/2015: Helsinki. Available at: 
http://vm.fi/documents/10623/1788346/Improving%20the%20resilience%20of%20Europe´s%20Economic
%20and%20Monetary%20Union/96d236f7-2b87-4e1b-a613-d90c1ff15a8c 
Parkes, Roderick 2016. People on the move – The new global (dis)order, Chaillot Paper 138, EU Institute for 
Security Studies: Paris. Available at:  http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_Paper_138.pdf 
Prime Minister’s Office, 2015. Finland, a land of solutions - Strategic Programme of Prime Minister Juha 
Sipilä’s Government. Government Publications 12/2015: Helsinki. Available at: 
http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10184/1427398/Ratkaisujen+Suomi_EN_YHDISTETTY_netti.pdf/8d2e1
a66-e24a-4073-8303-ee3127fbfcac 
 
  
 
New Pact for Europe - National Report - FINLAND 
LIST OF NATIONAL PARTNERS 
 
BELGIUM Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations  
ESTONIA Open Estonia Foundation 
FINLAND Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
FRANCE EuropaNova 
GERMANY Jacques Delors Institut - Berlin 
GREECE Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 
ITALY Istituto Affari Internazionali 
POLAND Institute of Public Affairs 
PORTUGAL Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation 
SLOVAKIA GLOBSEC Policy Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
